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Abstract: This paper explores the role that distrust of expert judgment plays in 
conservative critiques of higher education. We propose that academics should abandon the 
insistence on truth as the standard for the evaluation of research quality. Doing so would 
separate conservative critiques of higher education from broader concerns over expert 
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judgment via the substitution of judgement criteria more readily accessible to laypeople. 
Based on evidence about how expert judgment actually functions, we propose utility as  a 
standard accessible to all. We show this by describing a historiographic model of expert 
judgment within the research university. We close with a call for scholars to acknowledge 
the conflation of facts and values in their work—that is, its post-truth nature. 
Keywords: conservative critique; higher education; utility; expert judgment; pragmatism 
 
El profesorado y la era de la posverdad: Un análisis historiográfico del juicio de 
especialistas y la desestabilización de la verdad objetiva 
Resumen: Este artículo explora el papel de la desconfianza en el juicio de expertos en 
revisiones conservadoras de la enseñanza superior. Proponemos que los académicos 
abandonen la insistencia en el estándar para la evaluación de la calidad de la investigación. 
Hacerlo sería una crítica conservadora distinta del más fácilmente accesible al tipo. Con 
base en la evidencia de lo hábilmente hablando, proponemos la utilidad como un estándar 
accesible a todos. Lo mostramos describiendo un modelo historiográfico de juicio de 
especialistas dentro de la universidad de investigación. Concluimos con un llamamiento a 
los estudiosos para que reconozcan los hechos de su trabajo -es decir, su naturaleza 
posverdad. 
Palabras clave: conservative critique; enseñanza superior; utilidad; juicio de expertos; 
pragmatismo 
 
O professorado e a era da pós-verdade: Uma análise historiográfica do juizo de 
especialistas e a desestabilização da verdade objetiva 
Resumo: Este artigo explora o papel da desconfiança no juizo de especialistas em revisões 
conservadoras do ensino superior. Propomos que os acadêmicos abandonem a insistência 
no padrão para a avaliação da qualidade da pesquisa. Fazê-lo seria uma crítica 
conservadora distinta do mais facilmente acessível ao tipo. Com base na evidência de quão 
habilmente falando, nós propomos a utilidade como um padrão acessível a todos. 
Mostramos isso descrevendo um modelo historiográfico de julgamento de especialistas 
dentro da universidade de pesquisa. Concluímos com um apelo aos estudiosos para que 
reconheçam os fatos de seu trabalho - isto é, sua natureza pós-verdade. 
Palavras-chave: crítica conservadora; ensino superior; utilidade; juizo de especialistas; 
pragmatismo 
 
The Professoriate and the Post-Truth Era: A Historiographic Analysis of 
Expert Judgment and the Destabilization of Objective Truth 
 
For nearly four centuries, higher education institutions have been depicted by both academic 
and political leaders as serving desirable societal ends (e.g., Dorn, 2017; Geiger, 2015). Throughout 
most of this history, however, faculty members have also worked to establish and defend claims of 
specialized knowledge and vital expertise (Geiger, 1993, 2004). By the mid-1960s, these efforts had 
resulted in the full professionalization of the professoriate (Labaree, 2017; Rudolph, 1977). Within a 
professionalized professoriate, faculty members found their primary affinity with their discipline 
more often than their institution; found it difficult to gain employment without a doctoral or 
relevant professional degree; became more mobile throughout their careers; and often completed the 
abrogation of responsibility for students’ non-academic lives as their work lives increasingly focused 
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on research, teaching, and service—with research typically the most highly prized of these 
responsibilities (Schuster & Finklestein, 2006).  
Notably, however, the final transition to faculty-as-professionals rather than faculty-as-
educators occurred at precisely the same time that the profound social and political dislocations of 
the student protest movements arrived on American college campuses (cf. Boren, 2001; Jencks & 
Riesman, 1968). The result of these overlapping sea changes in the normal operation of colleges and 
universities saw voices across the political spectrum offer vociferous critiques of higher education 
(Hartman, 2016; Prothero, 2017). For liberal students and politicians, colleges and universities had 
grown far too cozy with the military-industrial complex and delivered a curriculum that ignored the 
experiences of minoritized persons (e.g., Acuña, 2011; Biondi, 2012; Carney, 1999; Ferguson, 2012; 
Plummer, 2013; Rojas, 2007). For conservative students and politicians, these liberal objections 
provided a foil for long-running objections to the perceived radicalism of the academy (e.g., 
Critchlow, 2011; Nash, 1976; Patterson, 1996, 2005). Ironically, the commonly held assumption that 
colleges and universities existed in service to society made them the perfect rhetorical battleground 
in the Culture Wars, a series of asymmetrical debates that have long sought to define core American 
values (e.g., Hartman, 2016; Petrzela, 2017; Prothero, 2017).  
Historians of higher education have documented the histories of student protests, political 
debates over the nature of the higher education, and structural changes to colleges and universities 
(e.g., Boren, 2001; Labaree, 2017; Loss, 2012; Thelin, 2011). Notably, however, historians have rarely 
systematically interrogated the interplay between these three historical narratives and the evolving 
nature of faculty work. As a result, we contend in this article that social scientists have not fully 
understood one of the key proximate causes for persistent contradictory findings about public 
support for higher education: the shift to a fully professionalized faculty dominated by expert 
judgment, a form of expertise with which some Americans have long felt discomfort (cf. Jencks & 
Riesman, 1968; Hofstadter, 1963). In this article, we contend that the simultaneous discomfort with 
and enthusiasm for higher education displayed by both liberals and conservatives stems from the 
opacity of the academic knowledge production process—from how research is funded to the 
technical language used to convey results to the limited ways that truth claims can be made—to 
virtually everyone not extensively trained in the academy in the same or in a closely related field. 
That is, both liberal and conservative critics of higher education hold that college and universities 
have ignored their responsibilities to “Truth” (cf. Hartman, 2016; Prothero, 2017) without clearly 
defining the term or recognizing that academics may use it in markedly different ways than they do.  
Moreover, we contend that academics might have exacerbated the potential for distrust by 
failing to address critiques of higher education when they occurred and by refusing to clarify their 
theoretical vocabularies when called to account for their lack of ready intelligibility. To address this 
problem, we examine the contemporary debate around truth in both contemporary political 
discourse and in the academy. Notably, we show that claims of a post-truth era—particularly as it 
pertains to higher education—might well be overstated. We also demonstrate that most academics 
have a more tenuous claim to truth than they might otherwise claim. We next demonstrate the 
origins of these problems by tracing the historiography of expert judgment in the professions and of 
conservative critiques of higher education. We show that many of these conservative critiques 
actually respond to substantive issues arising from the very nature of expert judgment. Finally, we 
argue that these issues can be addressed by adopting the approach to truth advocated by Rortian 
pragmatism.  
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Post-Truth in Contemporary Discourse  
 Anxiety over the status of truth is a long-standing mainstay in contemporary American social 
and political discourse. However, concerns about truth have reached fever-pitch since the 2016 
presidential campaign and election, amidst presidential declarations of alternative facts and accusations 
of deceit and misinformation targeting media outlets. Perhaps as a result of the anxiety created by 
these accusations, there has been concomitant concern over the role that discursive moments such 
as the Culture Wars might have had in creating the conditions under which fake news was able to 
emerge. In other words, many people have wondered whether concepts like cultural relativism are to 
blame for the president’s—and others’—ability to claim that opposing views are simply misinformed 
or untrue. Indeed, there seems to have been an intensification of these anxieties not only over what 
is generally agreed upon as true, but also over the institutions that American society typically looks 
to that help discern what is and is not true—the media, government bodies, and experts 
(Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016).  
 In the realm of education, one of the primary effects of this discourse concerning truth and 
expertise is the delegitimization of higher education. Institutions of higher education house experts 
in many different fields, the majority of whom produce research on issues that they believe are both 
relevant and beneficial to American society. However, the past several decades have seen a gradual 
increase in suspicion of and disregard for higher education (e.g., Gross, 2013; Grossmann & 
Hopkins, 2016). This suspicion is built, in part, from a conservative concern about an institution 
viewed largely as a space built by and for liberal intellectuals and wherein these same liberal 
intellectuals, in their roles as faculty members, might indoctrinate future voters (Gross, 2013). 
Reflecting this line of argument, most Republicans now believe that American universities negatively 
influence the country (Pew Research Center, 2017). This sentiment has increased within the past two 
years, coinciding with conservative political ascendance and rhetoric about fake news (Pew Research 
Center, 2017). Liberals, on the other hand, view higher education more favorably and typically hold 
that scientific and social scientific inquiry lead to the betterment of society via the production of new 
knowledge about social reality (Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016). Although simplified here, these views 
misunderstand both the aims of much academic research and actual scholarly debates about the 
nature of objectivity, subjectivity, and truth. Both of these views posit the existence of T/truth, 
identify the academy as a location where T/truth could be found and verified, and question whether 
trust can be safely placed with so-called experts. It is this complicated nexus of concerns about what 
constitutes the truth, suspicion of those traditionally entrusted with the truth, and the academy as a 
mistrusted site of truth that we interrogate in this article through an exploration of conservative 
critiques of higher education. 
Post-Truth in the Philosophy of (Social) Science 
 Academics who study knowledge production in the natural and social sciences have 
consistently noted that there are profound discrepancies between the way that the scientific method 
is described in theory and the way it functions in practice (e.g., Feyerabend, 2010; Fine, 1996; Kuhn, 
1996; Latour, 2010). Although the scientific method is typically regarded as a systematic approach to 
rigorous inquiry, the actual production of scientific knowledge, if often chaotic, and the utilization of 
scientific knowledge typically requires a mixture of professional expertise, popular sentiment, and 
political agency (e.g., Bowker & Star, 2000; Hacking, 1990; Latour, 1988, 2012; Porter, 1995). That 
problem is further exacerbated in the social sciences, where the connection between knowledge 
production and knowledge can be complicated by the involvement of human beings (e.g., Giddens, 
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1984; Lindblom & Cohen, 1979). Recognizing these differences, we regard the scientific method as 
the basic form of inquiry in both science-related fields and social science fields that seek to create 
experiments, quasi-experiments, or other conditions under which causal attributions can be made. In 
light of this focus, we use this section to show that two shifts—one being the shift from the 
conceptualization to the execution of the scientific method and the other being the shift from the 
production to the use of scientific knowledge—results in the conflation of what are, technically 
speaking, incommensurable truth claims (Feyerabend, 2010). To demonstrate how these 
incommensurable truth claims function, we first describe the shift from positivism to 
postpositivism. We then describe how both empirical findings about scientific work and 
philosophical discussions of truth produce considerable ambiguity within scientific practice. Finally, 
we suggest that the resultant scientific practice is a fundamentally pragmatic one.  
Virtually all definitions of the scientific method include the same features: the formulation, 
testing, and revision of hypotheses; systematic observation and measurement; and the use of 
experimental methods (e.g., Carey, 2011; Gauch, 2002; Gower, 1996). However, although both 
scientists and the general public would likely agree that these features are critical to good science, 
they would likely diverge with regard to the end product of scientific inquiry. The public 
conceptualization of science emphasizes the pursuit of universal truths (big “T” Truths), which is 
how originators of the scientific method from antiquity until the mid-1900s would also likely have 
framed their work (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). However, since the Popperian Revolution, scientific 
inquiry has been oriented toward falsification rather than Truth (Sigmund, 2017). According to this 
formulation, scientific inquiry can never demonstrate conclusively that something is “True” but 
rather when things are “Not True” (Popper, 1959/2002). Notably, however, the movement toward 
Truth remains the goal. That is to say that, under experimental conditions, the results of one’s 
inquiry show merely that one particular set of conditions results in a particular outcome. It cannot 
show conclusively why or how that occurs—although further experiments can help to rule out 
potential explanations while also marking others as more or less plausible. With sufficient evidence, 
scientists begin to treat the explanations that they generate as small “t” true while also 
acknowledging they do so only provisionally. Importantly, this distinction between truth and Truth 
can easily be forgotten in practice and is often missed entirely by non-scientists (cf. Kuhn, 1996; 
Neal, Smith, & McCormick, 2008).  
In an attempt to describe how knowledge production functions in general and in science 
specifically, some pragmatist philosophers have suggested that utility might be a more useful 
criterion for evaluating science than is truth (James, 1907/1981, 1909/1978). For pragmatists, utility 
is used to capture the capacity of an idea to generate understanding or to solve a problem of 
practical significance. This understanding of utility is predicated on the recognition that universal 
claims—that is, statements of big “T” Truth—can never be substantiated and that continuing to use 
the word truth to describe the results of inquiry is, therefore, problematic. Instead, pragmatists hold 
that both individuals and society as a whole have ever-evolving narratives that they use to explain 
observations of the world (Rorty & Engel, 2007). As new observations call into question prior 
knowledge, this narrative is adjusted continuously. Understandings that comprise the pragmatist’s 
narrative reality are inherently useful. They enable prediction of future events and explanation of 
past ones, but they are also subject to ongoing reevaluation and, according to Rortian pragmatism 
(Rorty, 1990, 1999), do not reflect meaningfully an objective reality but rather a socially constructed 
one. That is, once falsified, accounts of reality must be replaced by new explanations, which are 
always mediated by human experience. In other words, Rortian pragmatism recognizes that the 
things people label as true are, in fact, merely a story connecting those ideas that are not false.  
 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 26 No. 149      SPECIAL ISSUE 6 
 
Historiography of Expert Judgment  
  
 As we have shown, concerns about truth are widespread in both social and political 
discourse and in the philosophy of social science. These concerns both reflect and contribute to a 
foundational anxiety over the role and power of expert judgment in American society. In this 
section, we construct a brief historiography of expert judgment by drawing on two critical and 
interconnected histories: the development of professions and professionalization and the 
development of an American bureaucratic system. Exploring these historical developments provides 
several answers to the question of why Americans mistrust expert judgment quite so much: the 
democratic nature of the United States, the distance between those who are experts and those who 
are effected by expert decisions, and the persistent thread of anti-intellectualism that cycles 
throughout American history.  
 
Professions: Breadth versus Depth 
 
 While the traditional professions (e.g., the clergy, law, or medicine) emerged in the late 
medieval and early modern era, professionalization sped up and hit its stride in the United States in 
the late 19th century (Siegrist, 2015). Broadly speaking, occupations become professions through 
parallel processes that involve, on the one hand, demarcation of specialized knowledge (Bowker & 
Star, 2000) and, on the other, developments on the social, political, and cultural levels (Siegrist, 
2015). Typically, in order for a job to be considered a profession, there needs to be a well-defined 
body of knowledge over which the profession has control—both in terms of what the knowledge is 
and who has access to it—autonomy over their working environment, and a commitment to service 
to the public through their profession (Goldstein, 1984; Hatch, 1988; Siegrist, 2015). Additionally, 
professions require credibility; more often than not, that credibility is protected by requiring 
members to be certified by an institution, such as the state, legislation, or a higher education 
institution (Goldstein, 1984; Hatch, 1988; Siegrist, 2015). To a certain extent, this professionalization 
occurred due to the expansion of the capitalist state—there were more customers and more demand 
for goods and services (Siegrist, 2015). In the 20th century, the underclass created by a capitalist 
system required medical and social services, which led to increased professionalization for those 
realms, such as nurses or social workers (Siegrist, 2015).  
Higher education has been deeply involved with the professionalizing process. As mentioned 
previously, professionalization requires institutions to confer legitimacy. In the European context, 
this role was often played by the state, but higher education fulfilled that role in the United States 
(Hatch, 1988). It is no coincidence that, just as professionalization was increasing speed, research 
universities also emerged (Geiger, 1986). For research universities to emerge as a predominant 
institutional type, there needed to be both a proliferation of specialized subject matter over which 
people could become experts and increased proliferation of the idea that colleges should prepare 
students for careers, especially those in the burgeoning American corporate world (Geiger, 1986). 
Indeed, the university system was integral in the creation of esoteric bodies of knowledge that form 
one of the pillars of professionalization; this phenomenon was fueled by the creation of academic 
disciplines, communities, and associations (Geiger, 1986). The combined effect of the foundation of 
land-grant universities and the spread of the elective system meant that professional training became 
subsumed under higher education’s umbrella and the university became an institution that creates 
professions, legitimates their expert judgment, and ultimately obscures the process by which that 
judgment is produced (Geiger, 1986; Lindblom & Cohen, 1979). These developments were firmly in 
place by the 20th century and only became more deeply entrenched with the influx of federal and 
industrial money after both world wars (Geiger, 2004; Jencks & Riesman, 1968). However, it was 
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not until the Academic Revolution of the 1960s that the supply of high-qualified faculty members 
fully met the demands of colleges and universities (Jencks & Riesman, 1968; Thelin, 2011), which 
catalyzed a shift in the nature of faculty work from primarily institution-based to primarily discipline-
based (Schuster & Finklestein, 2006). That is, following the 1960s, most faculty members began to 
see themselves as disciplinary experts within professions rather than educators within institutions.  
 The effects of professionalization shaped the experiences of people ranging far beyond those 
who did the work—indeed, these effects emanated throughout society with profound consequences 
for the ways that people thought about themselves and professionals. Porter (1995) discussed 
professionalization and the development of the standard of objectivity in conjunction with each 
other. Professions such as actuaries and engineers developed objective standards in the face of 
public mistrust—evidence that this concern over expert judgment is of long standing (Porter, 1995). 
Rather than submitting to public scrutiny and knowledge, these privileged workers formed 
professions to maintain control over information and sought to expand the power of these 
professions (Porter, 1995). Goldstein (1984), in reconciling Foucault’s (1975/1995) disciplinary 
theory with the traditional sociological account of professionalization, argued that the men (as they 
so often were) who carried out the disciplinary mechanisms were also those whose occupations were 
in the process of professionalizing, such as doctors, psychiatrists, and teachers. This 
conceptualization puts the professions in partnership with the state as it developed bureaucratic 
systems to manage and to preserve populations (Goldstein, 1984).  
 
Bureaucracy: Managing Complexity 
 
 The late 19th century found American culture and society, like its systems of knowledge and 
work, becoming increasingly complex. The changes caused by the scientific and industrial 
revolutions increased the potential complexity of social and technological problems (Cowan, 1997), 
which meant that no single person could possess the knowledge to solve them. This growth in 
complexity in combination with the emergence of a money economy gave rise to the modern 
bureaucracy, especially in the context of a modern mass democracy (Nelson, 1982; Weber, 1947). 
Bureaucracy, in turn, rested on the availability and willingness of experts not only to fulfill their 
calling to service but also to place themselves as experts capable of solving social problems 
(Lindblom & Cohen, 1979). Ultimately, the combination of professional expertise and bureaucratic 
management had a profound effect on the way that the public perceives expert judgment in a 
democratic context. 
 Similar to the history of professionalization, understanding bureaucracies has its roots in 
classical sociology, but can be complicated by later poststructuralist developments. O’Neill (1986) 
deftly synthesized Weber’s formal analysis of bureaucracy with Foucault’s discursively produced 
bodies. Although Foucault and Weber understood rationalization differently, they both contend that 
bureaucratization is part of the rationalization of society (O’Neill, 1986). In many ways, Foucault 
grounds the Weberian analysis in its effects on the bodies of individuals within a bureaucratic 
society—in other words, the effects of a legal-rational bureaucratic system are played out physically 
in the discipline of bodies (O’Neill, 1986). These disciplinary strategies are often carried out through 
either the social sciences or professions legitimized by the social sciences, such as education, social 
work, management, or the prison industry (O’Neill, 1986). In many ways, professionalization fueled 
the bureaucratization of society, whereas the emergent bureaucracy demanded more professionals.  
 
Democracy and its Discontents 
  
 The interconnectedness of professionalization and bureaucratization has had a profound 
effect on the ways that Americans understand and trust expert judgment—or, rather, the ways that 
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they do not trust expert judgment. This mistrust is also connected to the distance that is in place 
between experts and non-experts and the long history of American anti-intellectualism. 
 As shown earlier, professionalization and bureaucratization involve both the exertion of 
control and autonomy over bodies of knowledge and the use of that knowledge to administer the 
state and the people within it. Through the end of the 19th century and into the 20th century, these 
processes increasingly fell under the purview of higher education. Research universities especially 
came to the fore in the proliferation of professions and the production of students to work in those 
professions (Geiger, 1986). These processes also removed decision-making from the realm of the 
quotidian—in other words, they introduced more distance between everyday people and the 
mechanisms that control their lives (Porter, 1995). Indeed, part of the professionalizing and 
bureaucratizing efforts was the concomitant institutionalization of objectivity as a hallmark of 
modern science (Porter, 1995). Quantification, objectivity, and their connection to impersonality was 
at once a tool to deal with distance and distrust and a way of creating that same distance for 
different audiences (Porter, 1995).  
 A key aspect of this historiography is its American context—both professionalization and 
bureaucratization took different routes in other countries. This context means that the development 
of the professions and the bureaucracy has occurred amidst American democracy and its deep-
seated mistrust of elitism (Hatch, 1988; Hofstadter, 1963; Jacoby, 2008). This mistrust is neither 
overt nor unrelenting but is instead expressed in ambivalence and unease as well as cyclical 
fluctuations in levels of anti-intellectualism (Hatch, 1988; Hofstadter, 1963). Anti-intellectualism has 
taken several forms, ranging from general mistrust of experts to outright hostility towards 
universities (Hofstadter, 1963; Jacoby, 2008). Hofstadter (1963) saw anti-intellectualism’s longevity 
linked to both the good intentions of its progenitors (e.g., the Great Awakening) and the fact that 
modern society will simply no longer function without experts, belying the long-standing myth of 
American self-sufficiency (Cowan, 1997). Notably, however, the 1960s saw a critical shift in the 
nature of this anti-intellectualism. What had been primarily a classed discourse (e.g., people with 
more education defended the idea of expertise, people with less education dismissed it) became a 
multivalent critique when conservative pundits began aggressively pursuing anti-intellectualism for 
political gain (e.g., Critchlow, 2011; Nash, 1976) and liberal intellectuals were forced to confront the 
high-profile failure of expert judgment in policy disasters such as school busing and the Vietnam 
War (e.g., Chomsky, 2002; Delmont, 2016; Formisano, 2004; Halberstam, 1972). Because experts are 
both produced by and housed in universities, anti-intellectualist attention most often focused on 
higher education. 
 
Reinterpretation of Conservative Critique Based on Historiography  
 
As described in the prior section, the depersonalized, unknowable nature of truth in modern 
society feeds into the distrust of expert judgment that pervades all segments of American society. 
Conservative commentators (e.g., Buckley, 1951; D’Souza, 1991; Sykes, 1990) have long-attempted 
to weaponize this lack of faith in expert judgment in order to frame liberal political values as 
problematic and to erode trust in institutions generally and universities specifically. This elision of 
concerns over expert judgment and faculty politics can be seen via an analysis of key texts written by 
conservatives during the Culture Wars. In this section, we show this process in operation using an 
analysis of Bloom’s (1987) The Closing of the American Mind. We then use examples drawn from other 
conservative works positioned as part of the Culture Wars to show that these critiques collectively 
display a deep skepticism about the wisdom of professionals, which they ground in an espoused 
belief in objectivity and a stated objection to the conflation of facts and values. They also frequently 
Introductions to rethinking education policy and methodology in a post -truth era 9 
 
posit that the skills and content for a better educational model can be found in the “great book,” 
which substitutes the decisions of a large number of contemporaneous experts for the past 
judgment of a far more limited subset of minds.  
 
Closing of the American Mind 
  
 Reacting to the threat that postmodernism posed to academic knowledge, Bloom (1987) 
suggested that there was only one possible solution: a fixed canon. Further, he argued that the only 
plausible foundation for that canon was the great books, a “generally recognized” collection of 
“classic texts” (p. 344), including works focused on “philosophy, theology, the literary classics, and 
on those scientists like Newton, Descartes, and Leibniz . . . [which] must help preserve what is most 
likely to be neglected in a democracy . . . not dogmatisms but precisely the opposite: what is 
necessary to fight dogmatism” (p. 254). This quotation displays the fundamental essentialism and 
pretense to objectivity of most conservative critiques of higher education.  
First, Bloom (1987) argued that a fixed canon centered on the great books presents value-
laden content in domains ranging from philosophy to physics as merely neutral content that can 
function at the catalyst and content for meaningful communication. According to Bloom (1987): 
. . . tradition is unambiguous; its meaning is articulated in simple, rational speech that 
is immediately comprehensible and powerfully persuasive to all normal human 
beings. America tells one story: the unbroken, ineluctable progress of freedom and 
equality. [. . .] But the unity, grandeur, and attendant folklore of the founding heritage 
was attacked from so many directions in the last half-century that it gradually 
disappeared from daily life and from textbooks. (p. 55) 
 
Here, Bloom responded directly to the critiques levied by liberal students and faculty members 
about the inattention of the academy to minoritized voices by denying the reality of their 
experiences.  By equating American history with “freedom and equality” (p. 55), Bloom made clear 
that he—like many conservative commentators on higher education—believes that there is but one 
singular experience of reality: his own. 
Second, Bloom’s work recalls long-running formulations of academic work that decenter the 
role of faculty members and assign the development of useful skills—such as the capacity to fight 
dogmatism—to the right kind of books (e.g., Potts, 2010; Reynolds, 2002; Sugrue, 1994). In this 
formulation, books are valuable because they pose difficult questions about the past and the 
present—and because they can represent common ground. In challenging us, they foster a mental 
discipline that has value in the “search for a good life,” which Bloom (1987) argued is the goal of an 
education (p. 34). Education then is a means to equip human beings for the constant striving for 
improvement that makes them “fully human” (p. 38). Notably, in his formulation of the great books 
curriculum, Bloom (1987) even argued against the presence of disciplines—warning the reader 
against “forcing them [books] into categories we make up” (p. 344). In making these claims, Bloom 
directly undercut the move toward expert judgment that anchors the modern systems of higher 
education. According to Bloom’s reasoning, no specialized disciplinary knowledge is required to 
confront difficult works, such as Newton’s and Leibniz’s original works on calculus, nor is the 
guidance of a faculty intermediary necessary. Instead, a person need only encounter these works as 
Bloom has and then they will presumably think as Bloom does, which is a mode of thought Bloom 
enjoys a great deal.  
Finally, Bloom clarified that a great books curriculum serves as a guard against the 
postmodern slide by inviting students to think deeply and holistically about the human condition. 
For example, Bloom argued that: “Cultural relativism succeeds in destroying the West's universal or 
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intellectually imperialistic claims, leaving it to be just another culture” and fosters a false appearance 
of openness that “denies the special claim of reason” to help determine that which is true (p. 39). 
According to Bloom, the great books function as a shared topic and media for communication while 
also providing people the skills with which to reason. In his estimation, without this foundation, 
society might not have a meaningful way to communicate nor have things worth discussing. Bloom 
(1987) argued that education inculcates similar values—“man’s natural rights”—and that these 
similar values provide a “fundamental basis of unity and sameness” that causes differences to 
“disappear or become dim when bathed in the light of natural rights, which give men common 
interests and make them truly brothers” (p. 27). For those who differ from Bloom’s perceived norm, 
that is an irredeemably problematic position in its attention to the value of human diversity.  
A Broad Context for Conservative Critique 
 Bloom’s (1987) critique of higher education advanced a singular view of both the role of 
higher education and the nature of society that can be seen across conservative critiques both prior 
to and subsequent to his work. This perspective holds that teaching the right sort of materials 
creates useful habits of mind and further delineates the bearer of that education as part of a cultural 
in-group. As in Bloom’s formulation, most conservative critiques of colleges and university curricula 
center on the perceived lack of focus on the classics—in Anderson’s (1992) framing: “It is difficult 
to improve on Aristotle, Shakespeare, or Adam Smith.” (p. 119). Notably, the conservative 
definition for the great books results in a curriculum populated almost entirely by books written by 
White, European men. Most conservative commentators do not ever really address the issue of 
representation or distinguish whether these books deliver a small “t” truth or a big “T’ Truth. When 
they do so, they typically follow D’Souza’s (1991) reasoning: “It is in liberal education, properly 
devised and understood, that minorities and indeed all students will find the means for their true and 
permanent emancipation” (p. 23). This line of argument holds that the world is built upon a 
particular set of values and approaches—those developed by and for affluent White men—and the 
only way to become a full participant in that world is to internalize those values.  
The essentialism and pretense to objectivity inherent in the conservative critique of higher 
education can also be seen in advocacy for a great books education as a form of cultural literacy, 
which is itself seen as vital for economic success and full democratic participation. The plainest 
statement of this belief comes from Charles Sykes (1988), who wrote: “Without apology, the 
undergraduate curriculum should be centered on the intellectual tradition of Western civilization. 
Quite simply, there are certain books and certain authors that every college graduate should read if 
he is to be considered truly educated” (p. 260). Like most conservative arguments regarding cultural 
literacy, this depiction relies on the essentialist assumption that knowledge is real and fixed—one 
either possesses it or does not. Consequently, a lack of familiarity with the most important of this 
knowledge becomes an unforgiveable intellectual sin. As D’Souza (1991) wrote: “The study of other 
cultures can never compensate for a lack of thorough familiarity with the founding principles of 
one’s own culture” (p. 255). Notably, in order to function effectively, this critique of cultural 
pluralism as a form of cultural relativism functions to provide an inherently limited perspective on 
what can and what cannot count as a legitimate form of knowledge.  
Conservative commentators skirt the issue of cultural pluralism by reframing cultural literacy 
as democracy: as Roger Kimball (1990) stated, an education in the classic texts of Western 
civilization provides access to “a tradition before which all are equal” (p. 61). As such, the recent 
postmodern argument that knowledge, as a socially constructed phenomenon, has normative 
implications is “as pernicious as it is common, implying as it does that political democracy is 
essentially inimical to authority, tradition, and rigor in its cultural institutions.” (Kimball, 1990, p. 6). 
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Based upon this essentialism, a fixed canon becomes important for two reasons: not only is it a 
democratic source of information, it is objectively good. That is, the canon creates democracy and is 
democracy personified.  
Sykes (1990) reflected this argument while also invoking the conservative bogeyman of 
postmodernism:  
. . . it is in the Western tradition that we find the origins of democratic society, of the 
focus on individual worth and human dignity, and of aspirations for human freedom. 
[. . .] To lose that legacy through a curriculum of enforced cultural amnesia is to 
deconstruct an entire civilization. (p. 15) 
 
Simply put, conservative critiques of higher education attempt to conflate political liberalism and 
postmodernism in order to undermine faith in the academic enterprise. In asserting that without a 
“central body of shared knowledge at the heart of university education,” we have entered into a 
society where we can no longer be sure of what knowledge a given person possesses, Sykes (1988) 
identified the crux of the traditionalist reaction to postmodernism (p. 82). This framing presupposes 
that human understanding has a fundamentally synthetic quality—that is, we want to reach common 
ground. As such, for conservative critics, any attempt to dissolve consensus is inherently 
problematic. Often, these critiques are levied at groups of students and intellectuals who have been 
traditionally marginalized by the academic establishment. D’Souza (1991) wrote that: “The problem 
with the idea of ethnically determined ‘perspectives’ is that it condemns us to an intellectual and 
moral universe in which people of different background can never really hope to understand each 
other” (p. 186). Likewise, Kimball (1990) argued that “radical” feminism represents “single biggest 
challenge to the canon as traditionally conceived” (p. 15).  
When conservative critiques of higher education shift from advocating for a return to an 
essentialized curriculum toward attacking particular minoritized groups, the conservative 
commentators make clear the stakes of the higher education-based battlegrounds in the Culture 
Wars. Colleges and universities function as powerful culture bearers that cannot be ideologically 
neutral; even as conservative commentators argue for that possibility, they also acknowledge it 
cannot be so, and instead advocate for individual choice in the matter. For example, Buckley (1951) 
described the college as a battlefield of competing ideologies:  
With the stage thus set, the college student enters as a spectator in the arena in which 
the multifarious forces fight it out. Using the tools that his academic training has 
provided him, he is to pick out truth and to shovel aside error. It is important that 
his choice be his own, for it is all the more valuable to him if there has been no 
exterior persuasion on behalf of one or the other protagonist. (p. 145) 
 
This same choice rhetoric is the basis for conservative commentators’ objections to being exposed to 
ideological positions with which they disagree. Kimball (1990), Sykes (1990), and D’Souza (1991) all 
decried the pernicious influence of the “victims’ revolution,” which they contend has led to 
unwarranted diversification of the curriculum on racial, ethnic, sexual, religious, and gendered lines. 
One representative passage comes from Kimball (1990): 
The political dimension of this assault on the humanities shows itself nowhere more 
clearly than in the attempt to restructure the curriculum on the principle of equal 
time. More and more, one sees the traditional literary canon ignored as various 
interest groups demand that there be more women’s literature for feminists, black 
literature for blacks, gay literature for homosexuals, and so on. The idea of literary 
quality that transcends the contingencies of race, gender, and the like or that 
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transcends the ephemeral attractions of popular entertainment is excoriated as naïve, 
deliberately deceptive, or worse. (p. xv) 
 
Highlighting the marginality of under-represented groups within the academy through the use of 
terms like interest groups, Kimball (1990) and others suggested that topics that would make the 
curriculum more representative are inappropriate on the basis of democratic power. They simply do 
not represent the majority point of view. As such, it becomes easy to dismiss contrary points of view 
as “ideologically motivated assaults on the intellectual and moral substance of our culture” (Kimball, 
1990, p. xviii) and higher education institutions as ethical wastelands characterized by “the 
fragmentation and incoherence of the curriculum; the nihilism that passes for the humanities; the 
politicization of both scholarship and the classroom; and the darkening shadow of intolerance and 
intimidation reflected in official attempts to limit free speech” (p. ix). 
 
Using Academia’s Post-Truth Ideology to Combat Contemporary Post-Truth 
Rhetoric 
  
 In this article, we have shown that: the United States has entered a post-truth era 
characterized by deep distrust of colleges and universities as well as deep investment in the 
importance of higher education; scientists and the general public utilize thinking of t/Truth in 
markedly different ways; Rortian pragmatism nicely encapsulates the natural state of scientific 
inquiry; distrust of expert judgment is widespread; and this distrust of experts is reflected in 
conservative critiques of higher education. This section advances the argument that the problem set 
created by the interrelationships among these observations is difficult, if not impossible, to 
disentangle. Therefore, we suggest that the easiest way of addressing the problem of the post-truth 
era is to simply stop predicating the value of natural and social scientific inquiry on the idea of 
t/Truth. Indeed, we would like to advocate against using either term; rather, we put forth the term 
utility as described by James (1907/1981, 1909/1978) and reframed by Rorty (1990, 1999) as a more 
versatile term.  
 Although abandoning a t/Truth standard might seem problematic, there is ample evidence 
that scientists already do so in practice (e.g., Fine, 1996; Latour, 2010). Additionally, a debate 
between Richard Rorty and Pascal Engel (Rorty & Engel, 2007) forecasts how such an effort would 
play out in practice while also providing a brief discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of this 
approach. In this debate, Engel began by critiquing the pragmatic conception of truth: t/Truth has 
no explanatory use; a correspondence theory of representation is inherently false; realism and anti-
realism debates are hollow; justification is a preferable epistemological aim to truth; and that this 
formulation does not diminish our ability to speak of causality or values, but that doing so must be 
predicated on contingency. Although it is quite clear from the framing he gave his arguments that 
Engel expected vociferous objection, Rorty simply agrees with his statement of pragmatism’s view 
of truth. Instead, Rorty’s response indicated the utility of this approach in redirecting non-
productive discourses: his lack of argument is designed to suggest that the fundamental nature of the 
debate is moot. For Rorty, academic arguments about the nature of t/Truth obscure the critical issue 
of what people actually do, which matters far more. He summarized this position in two ways: 
[1] To give meaning to an expression, all you have to do is use it in a more or less 
predictable manner—situate it within a network of predictable inferences. 
[paragraph] The question that matters to us pragmatists is not whether a vocabulary 
possesses meaning or not, whether it raises real or unreal problems, but whether the 
resolution of that debate will have an effect in practice, whether it will be useful. [. . .] 
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For the fundamental thesis of pragmatism is William James’s assertion that if a 
debate has not practical significance, then it has no philosophical significance.  
[2] . . . our responsibilities are exclusively toward other human beings, not 
toward “reality.”[. . .] Trying never to have anything but true beliefs will not lead us 
to do anything differently than if we simply try our best to justify our beliefs to 
ourselves and to others. (Rorty & Engel, 2007, pp. 34, 41, and 45) 
 
Following this line of reasoning, we suggest that academics should embrace Rortian pragmatism’s 
work on objectivity and follow it to its logical end (Rorty, 1990, 1999). Doing so requires that 
academics abandon any essentialist positions—foremost among them, the belief in truths or a Truth 
that is verifiable, communicable, or even useful.  
In making this argument, we acknowledge that we live in a time of posts—ranging from 
postmodernism to poststructuralism to post-truth. All these posts (except post-truth) advocate that 
we abandon the very idea of Truth. Although quite different from the public use of post-trust, 
academia’s time of posts reaches much the same conclusion: we lack a meaningful way to converse 
with one another in stable, consistent ways.  Instead, consistent with the tenets of Rorty’s 
pragmatism, we advocate adopting utility as the standard for clarifying the value and quality of 
academic work. Given the demonstrable political utility of this distrust of expert judgment, a central 
focus on utility not only would serve to reflect the actual practice of scientific inquiry but also would 
make clear to the public the precise way that they should consider our work. Although abstract 
judgments of truth might not be accessible, consistent with Rorty’s pragmatism, academics—
particularly those in applied fields like education—should be able to communicate why and how 
their work matters. Communicating utility would separate conservative critiques of higher education 
from broader concerns over expert judgment via the substitution of judgement criteria more readily 
accessible to laypeople (e.g., Porter, 1995).  
 
Implications  
 
We currently live in a tumultuous time: we have a U.S. president who vilifies the traditional 
media, declares most critiques or opposing opinions as fake news, and is a proponent of alternative 
facts. This rhetoric in which facts and truth are readily dismissed echoes throughout society and is 
discernible in the ways that people think about and talk about such issues as the value of college, 
faculty politics, and whether or not the Culture Wars are to blame for our current predicament. As 
shown earlier, distrust of academics, experts, and intellectuals is nothing new in American history 
(Hofstadter, 1963). But by reviewing both the historiography of expert judgment and the role of 
post-truth in social science, we were able to highlight the place that conservative attacks on higher 
education hold in that long history. We close by describing implications including: (a) a 
historiographic model of expert judgment within the research university; and (b) a call for scholars 
to acknowledge the conflation of facts and values in their work—that is, its post-truth nature. 
The historiography and theoretical discussions have many implications for the ways that the 
academy can assert itself against both post-truth rhetoric and conservative attacks. This 
historiography highlights the creation and formation of experts and professionals in this country—
individuals who exert a remarkable amount of power and decision-making over our everyday lives. 
This historiography also highlights the sources of popular distrust of expert judgment: reactions 
against perceived elitism, the country’s history as a democracy, and the distance and obfuscation that 
takes place between experts and the people whose lives are affected by their expertise. Taken 
together, this historiographic model implies that more transparency in expertise is warranted. 
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Professional, experts, and academics need to be more transparent about their work—not just their 
conclusions or the work’s utility, but the processes behind it, as well as their own assumptions about 
the nature of truth.  
In creating this transparency, scholars must acknowledge the conflation of facts and values 
in their own work. This acknowledgement includes interrogating assumptions about objectivity, lack 
of bias, and dispassionate inquiry inherent in academic work—indeed, a belief in objectivity or 
postpositivism is in itself a value. Rather than continue to cling to objectivity as a golden standard, 
academics should instead consider the concept of utility. It is important to note that we are not 
arguing that every piece of academic research must be readily useful in some transactional way. 
Rather, we suggest judgments of utility are inherently contextual; that is, prior utility judgements in a 
given realm (e.g., engineering, philosophy, film studies, medicine) provide the criteria by which the 
utility of new knowledge might be assessed. As Kuhn (1996) has shown, the scientific process 
typically does function in this way—even it is sometimes framed otherwise. Therefore, we argue that 
if academics were more transparent about the processes behind their research and are able to 
articulate the utility of their work—why their work matters, what intellectual history they are 
incrementally modifying, and how it might impact everyday life—the academy as a whole might 
garner more support and have a more ready response to critiques about the utility of a college 
education.  
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